## Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900010008-2

Security Information

SE-37

## Question

- WHAT WOULD BE THE FFFFCTS OF BOMBARDING TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
  IN COMMUNIST CHINA IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NAVAL BLOCKADE?
  - E. On the Soviet Bloc.



## Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900010008-2

SE-37

**W.F.** (Although omitted in the original terms of reference we believe that the following question is pertinent and should be considered in the preparation of SE-37.)

Any program of bombardment that would deny Soviet Bloc imports to China would also deny important Chinese exports to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union receives from China important supplies of minerals and agricultural products. China's entire production of mercury, antimony, tungsten, tin, and molybdenum is exported to the Soviet Union. China's production of cotton lint is equal to about 40% of that of the Bloc. Cotton, soybeans, and vegetable oils are exported to the USSR in substantial amounts and are important items in a war economy. There is some indication that China plans to supply these items to the Soviet Union in increasing quantities. Although a blockade and bombardment of transport facilities cutting off China from the USSR would reduce Soviet requirements for these items to some extent, it is probable that their denial would have serious repercussions in Soviet industrial production and strategic stockpiling programs. We do not know the net effect of the denial but believe that it would be an important consideration influencing the Soviet's reaction to a blockade combined with bombardment.